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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this research is to provide insights to Commanders in the field for attack-
the-network (AtN) operations in the fight against Improved Explosive Devices (IED).  
Established in 2006, the Improved Explosive Devices Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) has 
spent billions of dollars to execute its operational mandate: defeat the device, attack the 
network, and train the force.  JIEDDO has excelled in training the force and defeating the 
device, but lagged behind in providing necessary information to facilitate attack-the-
network operations.  To facilitate AtN operations, JIEDDO created a Counter-IED 
Operation Integration Center (COIC); this center provides analysis, but utilizes metrics 
that are not necessarily intuitive.  Rather than metrics, what commanders need is a clear 
understanding of what attack-the-network means in order to create lines of operations that 
undermine networks that use IEDs.  The goal of this thesis, therefore, is to define attack-
the-network, introduce social network analysis, provide a focused discussion on how to 
apply social relational information to operations, determine a targeted person’s relevance, 
provide operational commanders with a basic matrix to gain perspective on social 
interactions of network members, and offer case studies illuminating the difficulties 
inherent in network targeting.   
  
 vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. ATTACK-THE-NETWORK......................................................................................1 
A. PURPOSE.........................................................................................................1 
B. ATTACK-THE-NETWORK DEFINED.......................................................1 
C. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS AND THE IMPORTANCE OF 
WEAK TIES.....................................................................................................2 
D. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................5 
II. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS: AN OPERATIONAL COMMANDER’S 
FRAMEWORK............................................................................................................7 
A. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................7 
B. WHAT IS A NETWORK?..............................................................................7 
C. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS AND MILITARY 
APPLICATIONS .............................................................................................9 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER...11 
E. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................14 
III. ALGERIAN CASE STUDY......................................................................................15 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................15 
B. BACKGROUND ............................................................................................16 
C. FLN ORGANIZATION ................................................................................17 
D. FRENCH DISMANTLING OF THE ALN BOMB SECTOR ..................18 
IV. INDONESIA’S COUNTER-TERRORISM OPERATIONS.................................21 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................21 
B. NOORDIN’S NETWORK ............................................................................22 
C. 2003 MARRIOTT BOMBING .....................................................................23 
D. 2004 AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY BOMBING.............................................24 
E. INDONESIA’S CT OPERATIONS .............................................................26 
V. OPERATION YARBOROUGH...............................................................................31 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................31 
B. BACKGROUND ............................................................................................31 
C. IT TAKES A NETWORK.............................................................................34 
D. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................37 
VI. A WAR OF CONTEXT.............................................................................................39 
A. WHICH WAY TO THE FUTURE? ............................................................40 
LIST OF REFERENCES......................................................................................................45 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .........................................................................................51 
 
 viii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 ix
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Operational Commanders targeting matrix......................................................12 
Table 2. Noordin’s Marriot Bombers .......................................................................24 
Table 3. Noordin’s Australian Embassy Bombers.........................................................25 
 
 x
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
ALN  Armèe de Libèration Nationale 
AtN  Attack-the-Network 
BC  Betweenness Centrality 
CC  Closeness Centrality 
CCE  Comite de Coordination et d’Execution 
COIC  Counter-IED Operations Integration Center 
COIN  Counterinsurgency 
CT  Counter Terrorism 
DC  Direct Centrality 
DI  Darul Islam 
EFP  Explosively Formed Penetrator 
FLN  National Liberation Front 
IED  Improvised Explosive Device 
IRGC  Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps 
ISWAT Iraq Special Weapons and Tactics 
JAM  Jaysh al-Mahdi (militia) 
JI  Jemaah Islamiyah 
JIEDDO Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization 
ODA  Operational Detachment Alpha 
QF  Qods Force 
SF  Special Forces (Green Berets) 
SG  Special Groups (militia) 
SNA  Social Network Analysis 











The purpose of this thesis is to provide insights to Commanders in the field for 
attack-the-network (AtN) operations.  While a fusion cell, such as Counter-IED 
Operation Integration Center (COIC), provides analysis that supports attack-the-network 
operations, these organizations utilize metrics that are not necessarily intuitive.  Absent a 
clear understanding of the metrics involved, operational commanders are constrained in 
their application of the provided organizational insights in formulating lines of operations 
that undermine these networks.  The goal of this thesis, therefore, is to define attack-the-
network, introduce social network analysis, discuss how to apply social relational 
information to operations, determine a targeted person’s relevance, provide operational 
commanders with a basic matrix to gain perspective on social interactions of network 
members, and offer case studies illuminating the difficulties inherent in network 
targeting.  
B. ATTACK-THE-NETWORK DEFINED 
What is meant by attack-the-network (AtN) operations?  Counter-network 
operations usually focus on leadership targeting of an organization, which follows the 
logic that by catching the right hornet, the whole colony dies.  What is often overlooked 
in this approach, however, is that if just a worker bee is killed, the nest is aggravated and 
a much bigger problem is created.  While this concept provides a convenient metaphor to 
discuss possible targeting methodology, it seldom resembles the facts, because human 
networks are not directly analogous to a hornet’s nest.  In other words, not every situation 
can be resolved by a single kill or capture of the “queen.”  To better illuminate this 
challenge in attack-the-network operations, leadership targeting will be discussed in 
Chapter II. 
Attack-the-network operations, for the purposes of this thesis, are defined as 
actions, kinetic or non-kinetic, used to disrupt, destroy, or reduce an enemy’s capacity to 
mount terror operations, specifically groups that use IEDs.  In particular, the procedure 
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provided in this thesis will focus efforts on destroying a network’s functionality by 
attacking certain social relationships that tie the network together.  Attack-the-network 
operations, therefore, will focus on utilizing social network analysis to identify targets 
based on organizational principals. 
C. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS AND THE IMPORTANCE OF WEAK 
TIES 
SNA is a social science that examines the structure of the social ties between and 
among individuals, tribes, organizations, etc.1  As a result of its analytical components, 
SNA attracts and is used by scholars across the academic spectrum, such as sociologists, 
anthropologists, economists, mathematicians, computer scientist, statisticians and 
marketing specialists.2  One result of this dynamic is that books on the subject can be 
quite lengthy.3  The intention of this thesis is not to create SNA specialists, but to provide 
the operational commander and his staff a focused look at the use of SNA as a tool that 
can provide context to individuals that are known to interact with one another.  Once the 
individual’s context is known, an operational commander and his staff can then decide 
which, if any, lines of operation they wish to utilize in attack-the-network operations. 
A helpful distinction that social network analysts draw, and one that is relevant to 
the present study, is the difference between weak and strong ties.  Strong ties are those to 
actors with whom one engages regularly, such as close friends or family members.  Weak 
ties, by contrast, are ties to actors with whom one comes into contact with occasionally or 
rarely.4  While it might seem that interactions with strong ties should provide the most 
beneficial opportunities to an individual, studies show quite the opposite.  For example, 
in 1973, Mark Granovetter examined interpersonal relations between a single actor and 
                                                 
1 Linton C. Freeman, The Development of Social Network Analysis: A Study in the Sociology of 
Science (Empirical Press, 2004): 2. 
2 Linton C. Freeman, The Development of Social Network Analysis: A Study in the Sociology of 
Science, 5. 
3 See, for example, Stanley Wasserman and Katherine Faust. Social Network Analysis: Methods and 
Applications. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994) and David Easley and Jon Kleinberg, 
Networks, Crowds, and Markets: Reasoning About a Highly Connected World (Cambridge University 
Press, 2010). 
4 Sean Everton Tracking, Destabilizing and Disrupting Dark Networks with Social Network Analysis, 
Naval Post Graduate School electronic workbook, version 1.05, 12. 
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an acquaintance, in order to understand what, if any, beneficial affects these reciprocal, 
friendly, yet casual linkages could produce.5  In his study, Granovetter examined 
professionals in the Boston area and found that acquaintances, or weak ties, created more 
and better job opportunities than close friends, or strong ties, because close friends tend 
to know each other and thus information within the strong social group is readily shared.6  
Conversely, when a person runs into an acquaintance they have not seen in a long time, 
new information is shared that otherwise would not have been obtained.  Furthermore, 
the acquaintance is familiar enough with the person, such as a school mate or a prior co-
worker, that they can provide insight into the potential for happiness at the new position.7  
This connection outside of one’s core group, or cluster, is referred to as a “bridge,” 
because it provides the only connection between two points.8  Removal of this 
relationship, therefore, cuts the connection between the groups.  
A follow-up study by Onnela et al. examined the ties between mobile phone 
users.9  The authors analyzed phone records over an eighteen-week period and used the 
length of call and the frequency of calls between a pair of individuals as key indicators 
for strength of ties.  Consistent with their hypothesis the authors saw that the majority of 
strong ties, judged as such by the reciprocal nature and the long duration, were clustered 
together.10  Once groups were identified, the study moved to an analysis of the effects of 
removing specific ties.  The study revealed that removal of weak ties, starting from the 
weakest link and working up, caused the communication network to break apart, while 
the removal of strong ties had little effect on the overall integrity of the network.11  The 
 
                                                 
5 M. S. Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties,” American journal of sociology 78, no. 6 (1973): 
1361. 
6 M. S. Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties,” 1370. 
7 M. S. Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties,” 1371–1373. 
8 M. S. Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties,” 1364. 
9 J. P. Onnela et al. “Structure and Tie Strengths in Mobile Communication Networks,” Proceedings of 
the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 104, no. 18 (May 1, 2007): 7332. 
10 J. P. Onnela et al. “Structure and Tie Strengths in Mobile Communication Networks,” 7333. 
11 David Easley and Jon Kleinberg, Networks, Crowds, and Markets: Reasoning About a Highly 
Connected World (Cambridge University Press, 2010): 53. 
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authors, therefore, concluded that weak ties function as bridges in the network and 
maintain the network’s integrity, while strong ties play a significant role in maintaining 
the integrity of the local cluster.12 
Related to the idea of the importance of bridges is the small-world study of 
Stanley Milgram and Jeffrey Travers in which they selected at random a “target person” 
and a group of “starting persons” in order to map acquaintance chains.13  The basic 
premise was to understand how long it would take to transfer a selected item between two 
randomly selected individuals.  The researchers provided experimental guidelines to the 
starting person that included: an explanation of the study (mail a document to a named 
person at an unknown location), the target person’s name, and directions that if they did 
not personally know the target person, they were to send the document to an acquaintance 
they did know personally and believed provided the best chance for “success,”—success 
in this case meaning that the document reached the target person.14  The results of this 
and subsequent studies have helped illuminate the importance of bridges in the transfer of 
information, in this case a document.15  They have also demonstrated that the average 
“number of intermediaries” between two randomly selected people in the United States 
was approximately six links or ties.16  “Six degrees of separation,” as it is known, 
provides a unique insight into the usefulness of bridges in the diffusion process.   
 
                                                 
12 J. P. Onnela et al.  “Structure and Tie Strengths in Mobile Communication Networks,” 7336. 
13 Jeffrey Travers and Stanley Milgram, “An Experimental Study of the Small World Problem,” 
Sociometry 32, no. 4 (December 1, 1969): 428. 
14 Travers and Milgram, “An Experimental Study of the Small World Problem,” 428–429. 
15 See, for example, Duncan J. Watts, "Networks, Dynamics, and the Small-World Phenomenon." 
American Journal of Sociology (1999) 105:493–527; Duncan J. Watts, Small Worlds: The Dynamics of 
Networks Between Order and Randomness. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999); Duncan J. 
Watts, Six Degrees: The Science of a Connected Age (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2003) and 
Peter S. Dodds, Peter, Roby Muhamad, and Duncan J. Watts, "An Experimental Study of Search in Global 
Social Networks." Science (2003) 301:827–829. 
16 Travers and Milgram, “An Experimental Study of the Small World Problem,” 431.  
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These studies suggest a myriad of reasons why understanding networks, 
particularly dark networks, requires patience and attention to detail.17  They provide 
overarching considerations that an operational commander and his staff should address in 
targeting analysis.  First, weak ties, because they are typically the bridges between 
clusters, enable a rapid diffusion of tactics and techniques across a network, link one 
network to another, and provide a conduit for resupply of critical resources throughout 
the network.  Second, weak ties are casual relationships that hinder detection because 
they are limited in nature and reside outside of the main group.  Third, weak ties present a 
challenge at the tactical level because, in general terms, if the military focuses on an 
enemy it assumes has a similar design as itself and fails to identify the context of 
individuals, then it will miss an opportunity to “remove the legs” of their opponent.  SNA 
provides context to the overall structure of a network as well as it allows the staff to 
visually display relationships that can be attacked or exploited.18  More importantly, 
through the understanding the power of weak ties, an operational commander and his 
staff can align targeting information and tactical operations with their operational goals. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Current military doctrine does not present in-depth analysis of attacking and 
defeating IED networks.  Furthermore, the idea of weak ties suggests one reason why the 
“conventional wisdom,” or basic intuition, of leadership targeting does not maximize the 
probability of network collapse.  The following thesis will provide one means for 
tracking and understanding the effects one has on networks through the implementation 
of a focused SNA approach.  As such, the thesis proceeds as follows.  Chapter II will 
present ideas for the operational commander and his staff in regards to employing SNA.  
It identifies key constructs such as network design, provides social metrics to focus 
identification on key positions within the organization, and finishes with a matrix to 
visualize lines of operations in support of attack-the-network.  A familiarity with the idea 
of weak ties, therefore, will maximize the usefulness of the included matrix. 
                                                 
17 The term dark networks is used to describe IED, terror, or any other network that must remain 
covert in order for the network to survive in its operational environment. 
18 B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy: Second Revised Edition, 2nd ed. Plume, (1991): 349. 
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Chapters III, IV, and V will provide case studies to show the benefit of 
understanding networks and the associated roles performed by individuals.  Chapter III 
will examine Algeria and the effective, at least in the short run, yet completely 
unacceptable way for attacking an IED network.  Chapter IV examines Indonesia’s 
tracking and eventual destruction of the Noordin Top IED Network.  Chapter V will 
examine operations to counter the effects of IEDs in Iraq and the successful tactics 
employed during Operation Yarborough. 
Chapter VI offers concluding thoughts on the what effect of attacking IED 
networks has on the overall picture of success in defeating an insurgency.  Findings will 
include a recommendation for a change in the military lexicon to encourage a broader 
spectral analysis in network targeting, reasons for using IEDs in an insurgency, and how 
insurgencies typically end. 
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II. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS: AN OPERATIONAL 
COMMANDER’S FRAMEWORK 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Information on “attack the network” operations in military doctrine is sparse, and 
provides a limited understanding of what a network is, and how best to undermine it.  
However, in academia, literature on analytical tools and their utility in targeting insurgent 
IED cells or networks, such as social network analysis (SNA), is growing rapidly.19  
Targeting an enemy network is as multi-faceted as IED construction and therefore 
requires an in depth understanding of what a network is and how to attack it.  This 
chapter will, therefore, provide a brief description on network typology, and offer a 
computational and visual analytical tool to help illuminate some of the ways for attacking 
the networks responsible for the placement and detonation of IED’s.  In the course of the 
following discussion, this chapter will also forward ideas to enhance critical thinking and 
debate between the operational commander and his staff in executing “attack the 
network” operations. 
B. WHAT IS A NETWORK?  
In order to attack the network, one must first have a basic understanding of what a 
network is.  We will discuss network typology in two ways: macro, by the organizational 
design; and micro, through social network analysis, which identifies the individual types 
of nodes within the organization, or network.  Focusing first at the macro level, 
organizations can be broken down into two main categories, those that are hierarchical in 
design and those that are distributed.  A hierarchical organization, or network, is highly 
centralized and similar in structure to a large corporation, such as the military or any 
heavily bureaucratic organization, with information flowing to one central point.20  The 
                                                 
19 K. M. Carley, Dombroski, M. Tsvetovat, J. Reminga, and N. Kamneva, “Destabilizing Dynamic 
Covert Networks,” (in proceedings of the 8th international Command and Control Research and 
Technology Symposium, Pittsburg, Pennsylvania, 2003).  Nancy Roberts and Sean F. Everton, “Strategies 
for combating dark networks,” Journal of Social Structure, Vol. 12, No. 2, (2011): 1–32. 
20 R. L. Daft, Essentials of Organization Theory and Design, Mason, OH. (2003): 107–111. 
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weakness within a hierarchical design is that information flows to one “great leader,” for 
interpretation and response, which slows reaction time and adaption to the changing 
environment.21   
Distributed networks, or the organizations typically targeted in attack the network 
operations, are the operational elements of the current IED fight, and can be broken down 
into three types: an all channel network, in which each node is linked to every other node; 
a star or hub network, in which one node serves as the central actor, which all other nodes 
must use to coordinate; and a chain or line network, in which people, information, and 
supplies, travel along a single path and where direct end-to-end communication does not 
exist.22  The distributed network’s strength lies in its innate ability to diffuse information 
through the network, and absorb shocks, or pulses, to the system, such as the capture or 
death of key individuals from coalition forces.23  The organizational design of a 
distributed network is, therefore, distinct in its ability to quickly adapt to a situation or 
changing environment.24   
Yet, within these seemingly amorphous groups, there is resemblance of a 
hierarchical structure, based on prestige, in which opinion leaders guide the networks 
adaptations.  Opinion leaders are those members of a network that are able to informally 
influence others attitudes or actions.25  The fluidity within the group’s dynamics often 
means that the removal of this opinion leader, or a refocus of the group opinions, does not 




                                                 
21 John Arquilla and David F. Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and 
Militancy (Rand Corporation, 2001): 4. 
22 John Arquilla and David F. Ronfeldt, Swarming and the Future of Conflict (RAND Corporation, 
2000): 58–59. 
23 John Arquilla and David F. Ronfeldt, Swarming and the Future of Conflict, 52. 
24 John Arquilla and David F. Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and 
Militancy, 12.  K. M. Carley, Dombroski, M. Tsvetovat, J. Reminga, and N. Kamneva, “Destabilizing 
Dynamic Covert Networks.” 
25 Everett M. Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations, 5th Edition (Original Free Press, 2003): 24–37. 
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networks to overcome pulsing attacks on the leadership, and is why these relationships 
are often difficult to understand for people who work in environments dominated by the 
hierarchical framework.26   
On the micro side of network analysis are the different measurements SNA gives 
in order to provide context to the intelligence picture.  Three measurements are 
particularly important to the commander: degree centrality (DC), betweenness centrality 
(BC), and closeness centrality (CC).  A brief description is provided to show the unique 
position each associated term has within the network and ways to target each.   
• DC: focus is on the most active and visible members of the network, 
typically recognized as a leader within the network.27 
• BC: focus is on the actors that are the path, or conduit, for two nodes to 
communicate.  The more information and communications “funneled” 
through a node the higher the betweenness scores.28 
• CC: focus is on how close an actor is to all other actors in the network, 
and reflects someone who can quickly interact with all others in the 
network.29 
The combination of identifying the type of network one faces, and the actors or 
nodes within that network allows potential targets to be mapped and understood through 
SNA.  This provides the operational commander and his staff the unique ability to decide 
on whether to use either a non-kinetic information operation/deception tactic, a kinetic 
kill or capture tactic or a combination. 
C. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS AND MILITARY APPLICATIONS 
Social network analysis, in its modern form, is accomplished using computer 
software with specifically designed algorithms that allow analysis of the patterns and 
structural properties of human relationships that define the inner workings of a specific 
                                                 
26 K. M. Carley, Dombroski, M. Tsvetovat, J. Reminga, and N. Kamneva, “Destabilizing Dynamic 
Covert Networks.”  
27 Stanley Wasserman and Katherine Faust, Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications, 1st 
Edition (Cambridge University Press, 1994), 178. 
28 Stanley Wasserman and Katherine Faust, Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications, 1st 
Edition, 188–189. 
29 Stanley Wasserman and Katherine Faust, Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications, 1st 
Edition, 188–189. 183. 
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group or network.30  SNA’s software visualization capability provides an important 
quantitative display of relational ties within a network.  For example, Valdis Krebs, who 
mapped the 9/11 terrorist network, and Jose Rodriguez, who mapped the March 11th 
Madrid bombing network, display the military application of SNA, by identifying the 
relations of those involved in these terrorist events.31  In doing so, their research furthered 
the discussion on the importance of weak ties and the challenge of limited data on dark or 
covert networks.32  In particular, Krebs points out that the strategy used by the 9/11 
hijackers to keep cell members distant from each other was specifically designed to 
minimize damage if one member was compromised.33 
However, what make endeavors in SNA worthwhile is that, if an operational 
commander can overcome his informational disadvantage through the application of 
intelligence gleaned from reconnaissance, village surveys, individual interviews, police 
assets, or any number other intelligence gathering resources, he can begin to literally 
develop a picture of his opponent and the network that supports his nefarious IED 
activities.34  This information, analyzed through SNA software, can provide valuable 
insights on an enemy’s network design from which weakness can be identified and 
targeted for either attack or exploitation operations.  The observed change in the network, 
from an operation, then can be compared against the anticipated results and thereby 
confirm or deny the effectiveness of a chosen strategy.  From there, the operational 
commander can maintain the current course of action or reassess and attack via an 
alternate line of operation.   
                                                 
30 Barry Wellman, “Toolkit Essay,” Review of The Development of Social Network Analysis: A Study 
in the Sociology of Science, by Linton Freeman, Contemporary Sociology, May 2008, Vol. 37, No. 3, Book 
Review: 222. 
31 V. E. Krebs, “Mapping Networks of Terrorist Cells,” Connections 24, no. 3 (2002): 43–52.; J. A. 
Rodríguez, “The March 11th Terrorist Network: In its Weakness Lies its Strength,” Working Papers EPP-
LEA (2005). 
32 V. E. Krebs, “Mapping Networks of Terrorist Cells,” 44. 
33 V. E. Krebs, “Mapping Networks of Terrorist Cells,” 46. 
34 Gordan H. McCormick and Frank Giordano, “Things Come Together: Symbolic Violence and 
Guerrilla Mobilisation,” Third World Quarterly 28, no. 2 (January 1, 2007): 308. 
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SNA is, therefore, a type of applied art where social science and mathematics 
collide and value is determined by the operational commander.  As an art style, however, 
SNA only represents one genre within the larger collective body of social relationship 
studies and should, therefore, be utilized as a tool and not the only means to an end.35   
D. RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER 
The success of a particular strategy will depend on the type of network you are 
trying to attack.  As such, attack the network operations that work for one network may 
not work for another because of size, social structure, and because nodes are living and 
adapting beings.36  This is where the judgment of the operational commander will be a 
balancing act between action and a wait-and-see posture.  Unfortunately, this method 
places the operational commander on the horns of a dilemma: act and you alert the 
network you know of its existence and allow its members to escape; do not act and risk 
more casualties because the network persists. 
The Holy Grail in attack-the-network operations is targeted killings that end a 
network’s activity.  In reality, targeted killing alone may not undermine an organization, 
and this option must be balanced against other possible operational approaches.  For 
example, in her study of 298 groups, Jenna Jordan shows that, in order to understand if 
targeted killing would be effective, one has to take into consideration organizational age, 
type, and size.37  This is where the amorphous network design and fluid concept of 
leadership presents its greatest challenge to hierarchical based thinkers.  Even with these 
considerations taken into account, there is still no predicting when decapitation will 
actually be an effective means to ending an organization.38   
 
                                                 
35 Nancy Roberts and Sean Everton, “Strategies for Combating Dark Network.” 
36 K. M. Carley, Dombroski, M. Tsvetovat, J. Reminga, and N. Kamneva, “Destabilizing Dynamic 
Covert Networks.” 
37 Jenna Jordan, “When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation,” 
Security Studies 18, no. 4 (2009): 719–755. 
38 K. M. Carley, Dombroski, M. Tsvetovat, J. Reminga, and N. Kamneva, “Destabilizing Dynamic 
Covert Networks.” 
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The main intention of this thesis is to examine the literature in the light of actual 
cases and highlight best practices for attacking networks that use IEDs.  Table 1 is 
provided as an easy reference for the operational commander to inform decisions about 
attack the network operations. 
 
Interdiction vs. Channeling 
Interdiction Channeling Targeting Matrix 
Sequential Simultaneous Sequential Simultaneous 
DC         
BC         Small Network 
CC         
DC         
BC         Large Network 
CC         
Table 1.   Operational Commanders targeting matrix 
Starting with the horizontal axis, the first decision point is whether one is facing a 
large or small network.  The pros and cons of a small network verses a large network 
campaign involves an inverse in strategy because “size matters.”39 A large organization, 
such as Hezbollah, will suffer a lesser degree of disrupted operations when unique 
specialized operators are eliminated; however, a smaller group, such as the Special 
Groups in Iraq, will feel a greater impact to operations.  The degree of the impact to the 
smaller group is based on many things including: being less able to adapt to its 
environment, reducing performance as a result of lost skill set, inhibiting the flow of 
information.40  In other words, a small network would be more likely to succumb to 
shocks to its operational structure, yet it is hard to uncover the fact that it exists.  On the 
other hand, large networks are easier to uncover, but much harder to design shock factors 
that will reduce or eliminate its existence.  
                                                 
39 Jenna Jordan, “When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation,” Security 
Studies 18, no. 4 (2009): 719–755. 
40 K. M Carley, J. S Lee, and D. Krackhardt, “Destabilizing networks,” Connections 24, no. 3 (2001): 
31–34.  
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The next decision point is which node to attack or manipulate, based on centrality 
measures, with a more refined explanation of these metrics below. 
• DC: this measures “where the action is,” and provides a metric for 
network leadership that can be used in determining targets or targeting 
effects.41 
• BC: are the people within the organization that bridge the gap between the 
local network and its outside means of support for people, guns and 
money. 
• CC: represents someone who can quickly access a multiple nodes of the 
network. 
Shifting to the vertical axis, the commander’s method of approach is the first 
decision.  Interdiction is a kinetic approach, typically a direct action mission, with the 
intent to kill or capture the intended target.42  Channeling, on the other hand, is a non-
kinetic attack on the node(s) or actor(s) that represents the route traveled by particular 
resources, assets, or pieces of information.  Channeling can be done any number of ways, 
including: psychological operations aimed at influencing the emotions, reasoning, 
cohesion and behavior of a network; amnesty, negotiations, political opportunities or a 
similar strategy of enemy engagement; information operations aimed at reducing the 
means to communicate or targeting electronic devices; increasing the cost benefit 
analysis for the network members by increasing the punitive measures against their 
particular activity; network burn out; or backlash from the population over actions use by 
the network.43 
In actuality, the above decisions are not either-or situations, but a combination of 
techniques best suited to attack a specific network. 
                                                 
41 Stanley Wasserman and Katherine Faust, Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications, 1st 
Edition, 179. 
42 Nancy Roberts and Sean F. Everton, 2009, "Strategies for Combating Dark Networks." 
43 Nancy Roberts and Sean F. Everton, 2009, "Strategies for Combating Dark Networks", A. K. 
Cronin, “How al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups,” International Security 31, no. 




While SNA is not a panacea against terror organizations, it does provide a good 
reference point for estimating the effectiveness of actions taken to attack dark networks.  
The dilemma that the operational commander must face is to either act or wait for more 
information.  SNA provides a valuable tool for making this decision.  It is therefore 
necessary to ensure attack the network is more than just a concept in a publication, but is 
tangible with causal logic and tools for analysis.  How an Operational Commander thinks 
about networks, and a reassessment of the logic associated with relational ties, must 
occur as we adapt to the fluidity inherent in a networks basic structure.   
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III. ALGERIAN CASE STUDY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
There have been several debates as to what is the best way to defeat a terrorist 
network.  Amongst these debates is the question, “how effective is leadership targeting”?  
Some theorists have suggested that eliminating the leader is effective only when engaging 
a small network.  This argument suggests that larger networks have the ability and depth 
to promote within the network, making leadership targeting ineffective.  Other scholars, 
such as John Arquilla, argue that “it takes a network to fight a network.”.44  Forming 
smaller specialized military units to combat a terrorist network is far more effective than 
fighting a network with a conventional force.  This chapter will show how the French 
were able to combine the two theories of leadership targeting as well as using a network 
to fight a network to stop the National Liberation Front’s (FLN) terrorist bombings 
during the Algerian Revolution from 1954–1962.  
It is important to note that while the French lost the overall war in Algeria, they 
conducted several successful special operations aimed at countering the FLN.  Out of the 
many French operations conducted during the Algerian War, their offensive strategy 
during the “Battle of Algiers,” which aimed to disassemble the leadership of the Armée 
de Libération Nationale (ALN), was the best way to put an end to the terrorist attacks.  
The actions taken by the 10th Paratroop Division should be a learning tool for all future 
counterinsurgency operations aiming to tear down a network.  The use of the Battle of 
Algiers as a model for counterinsurgency has been discouraged because of the 10th 
Paratrooper Division’s use of torture.  However, it is important to recognize that while 
the interrogation tactics used in the Battle of Algiers cannot (and should not) be followed, 
there are still valuable lessons learned from the French’s operational objectives.  The 
tactics they used by in this engagement are classic examples of how to conduct 
counterinsurgencies (COIN) today.45  
                                                 
44 John Arquilla, and David F. Ronfeldt. Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and 
Militancy. Rand Corporation, 2001. 
45 David Gulaula, Counter-insurgency Warfare, (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1964). 
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B. BACKGROUND  
By 1954, France had controlled Algeria for over a century.  France’s governance 
of Algeria catered solely to European settlers.  European cultural influence soon took 
over, destroying Algeria’s social, cultural, linguistic, religious, and economic 
structures.46  Under the French, Algerians lost 85 percent of their landholding and had no 
political influence.  Algerian Muslims were denied the opportunity to hold political office 
by the French government; local Europeans held all the political positions even though 
Algerian Muslims made up the majority of the population.  Algerians’ desired to have the 
same rights as French citizens.47   Instead they were treated as second class citizens.  
After several failed attempts to achieve unity through political elections, Algerian 
Muslims, totaling about nine million, began to have “no hope of attaining equality or 
freedom within the French Political system….”48   Following this systematic oppression, 
the terrorist nucleus of the FLN formed and started a nationalist revolution to liberate 
Algeria.   
In November 1954, the Algerian Revolution began with a wave of attacks across 
Algeria that aimed to remove the French government.  French officials began 
counterinsurgency operations against FLN bases and, “what had begun as terrorist 
bombings and raids on isolated French farms by armed groups of the Algerian FLN, had 
turned into a bloody, no-quarter guerrilla war.”49  FLN members caused havoc amongst 
both French and Algerian citizens by placing bombs in public buildings, police stations, 
cafes, cinemas, and dance halls in Algiers and in other cities and towns.50   Robert 
Lacoste, the minister of Algeria at the time, proved to be powerless in stopping the FLN 
from bombing the city of Algiers with his conventional forces.  Conversely, FLN 
members were initially successful in their strategy of guerilla warfare, with FLN 
                                                 
46 Martha Crenshaw, Revolutionary Terrorism: The FLN in Algeria, 1954–1962 (Stanford: Hoover 
Institution Press, 1972): 2. 
47 Martha Crenshaw, Revolutionary Terrorism, 6. 
48 Martha Crenshaw, Revolutionary Terrorism, 6. 
49 Howard Simpson, The Paratroopers of the French Foreign Legion: From Vietnam to Bosnia, 
(Washington: Brassey’s, 1997): 16. 
50 Howard Simpson, The Paratroopers of the French Foreign Legion: From Vietnam to Bosnia, 31. 
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operators mixed into the population, making them hard to find by the French army.  In 
1956, Lacoste called upon the help of the 10th Paratroop Division to restore power and 
order to the city of Algiers.51  The launch of this counter, unconventional based campaign 
between the FLN and Paratroopers later became known as “Battle of Algiers.” 
C. FLN ORGANIZATION 
The FLN was controlled by a five member committee called the Comite de 
coordination et d’Execution (CCE).  In efforts to control the city of Algiers, the 
committee organized the city into Zone Autonome d’Alger (ZAA); the ZAA was divided 
into three regions and then broken down into sectors, subsectors, quarters, groups and 
cells.  This structure formed a network designed to preserve anonymity and security.  It 
was estimated that 750 to 1,000 militants were organized inside the ZAA.52  
Algerian insurgency expert Martha Crenshaw argues that “The FLN organization 
was characterized by excessive local autonomy, collegial decision making, elaborate and 
complex clandestine networks.”53  All military activities inside the ZAA were under the 
leadership of Saadi Yacef.  Yacef created a special sector as part of his network called 
Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN), or what he referred to as “reseau special 
bombes,” in which he recruited students and technicians who were skilled in bomb 
making.  The term reseau is a French word for network.  Yacef’s bomb network had a 
process, supervised by Ali la Pointe, which was strictly compartmentalized: laboratory 
work, transportation, storage, distribution and, finally, the placing of the bombs in chosen 
spots.54   It was estimated that the ZAA possessed 150 bombs at the start of the “Battle of 
Algiers.”  
                                                 
51 Matthew Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution,(New York: Oxford University Press, 2002): 125. 
52 Martha Crenshaw, Revolutionary Terrorism: The FLN in Algeria, 1954–1962 (Stanford: Hoover 
Institution Press, 1972): 10. 
53 Martha Crenshaw, Revolutionary Terrorism, 12. 
54 Martha Crenshaw, Revolutionary Terrorism, 10. 
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D. FRENCH DISMANTLING OF THE ALN BOMB SECTOR  
Unable to control the insurgency through political means, France relied on 
military actions lead by General Massu.  France’s counterinsurgency plan was divided 
into an offensive strategy and a defensive strategy.  Offensively, its objective was to 
disassemble the ALN’s organization; defensively it aimed to protect the civilian 
population form terrorist attacks.55 
The most notorious offensive clandestine operation was called la bleutie; headed 
by Captain Paul-Alain Leger, a counter-terrorism expert on the staff of the 10th Paratroop 
Division.  Operation la bleutie took FLN activists and transformed them, primarily 
through the use of torture, into a network of agents under Leger’s control.  Some of these 
agents were sent back onto the streets of Algiers disguised as street sweepers and 
municipal workers to sabotage the FLN by creating distrust among its members.  They 
mingled with FLN military units, planting incriminating forged documents and spreading 
false rumors of treachery.56   This operation created disruption and confusion within the 
FLN, causing them to turn on each other.  
Operation La bleutie’s most valuable attribute was its ability to gather 
intelligence.  Agents infiltrated the ALN network and discovered who the bosses were 
and their locations.  This information became a key element in preventing ALN bombing 
attacks.  Leger’s first targets were Morad and Kamel, Yecef’s chief bomb maker and his 
military deputy, respectively.  Agents tipped off the Paratroopers that the two terrorists 
were in an apartment building in Impasse Saint-Vincent, and on August 26, the 
paratroopers raided the building in order to seize Mourad and Kamel.  Capturing them 
alive was the number one priority because they might have information concerning 
Yacef’s whereabouts.  Kamel was shot, but paratroopers still succeeded in capturing him 
alive.  Mourad, on the other hand, blew himself up by accidentally dropping a grenade 
                                                 
55 Martha Crenshaw, Revolutionary Terrorism: The FLN in Algeria, 1954–1962 (Stanford: Hoover 
Institution Press, 1972): 117. 
56 France and the Algerian War 1962–63, ed.  Martin Alexander, and J. F. V. Keiger, (London: Frank 
Cass, 2002): 7. 
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while trying to throw it at the paratroopers.57   With Mourand and Kamel gone, the ALN 
was down to its top two leaders, Ali la Pointe and Yacef.  One month after Kamel’s 
capture, Leger’s agents provided paratroopers with Yacef’s location.  A second raid 
captured Yacef, and once in custody, he gave up the location of Ali la Pointe, whose 
capture guaranteed the end of terrorist strikes committed by ALN members and 
effectively ending “The Battle Algiers.”58   Paratroopers lifted the city’s curfew, schools 
were reopened and people were no longer afraid to fill shopping malls or go to the 
cinemas.   
The actions taken by the 10th Paratroop Division should be a learning tool for all 
future counterterrorism operations aiming at tearing down a network.  Alistair Horne, an 
Algerian historian and author of A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, illustrates the success 
Paratroopers had with their operational strategy of leadership targeting: 
No one could doubt that the paras had scored a major victory for the 
French army, the first clearly definable one of the war.  They had faced up 
to a confrontation with the FLN and won hands down…he then quotes 
Massu saying “We had rounded up the leaders and broken up the system.  
There were no more assassination or bomb attempts.”59 
The paratroopers were successful in exposing ALN’s network by forming their 
own clandestine network.  Once they knew how the network functioned, they were able 
to diffuse it by eliminating the leaders.  Leadership targeting did not help the French win 
the “big war,” but it did successfully eliminate a terrorist cell inside Algeria.  This is a 
military option that should be considered and available to all military leaders.  
 
                                                 
57 Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace, (New York: Viking Press, 1977): 212. 
58 Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace, 212. 
59 Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace, 218. 
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IV. INDONESIA’S COUNTER-TERRORISM OPERATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Insurgents use terrorism as a strategy to achieve their political goals.  Over the 
past two decades, we have seen a new form of terrorism spread dramatically.  These 
insurgents have developed networks throughout the world composed of highly motivated 
individuals, and logistical support, to perform terrorist acts.60  Through networks, 
insurgents have been able to gain funding, support and manpower to build explosives that 
cause devastation.  Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) have become the weapon of 
choice for insurgents as well as the leading cause of death to service members deployed 
in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom.61  
Networks that use IEDs have not only killed and terrorized the military, but 
civilians as well.  A prime example is Noordin’s network, a splinter group of Jemaah 
Islamiyah (JI), which terrorized Indonesia until its demise in 2009.  Roberts and Everton 
believe that understanding the social network of an insurgency can provide an operational 
combat commander with a better understanding of the threat they face, which will result 
in better strategic decisions.  They argue, “Understanding which strategic option to 
pursue and under what conditions remain more of an art than a science.”62  Both authors 
would agree, along with other social network analysis scholars, that there is no single 
option for defeating insurgencies.  This theory has held true in Indonesia, where the 
Indonesians deciphered the structure of Noordin’s network and understood that it would 
take more than leadership targeting to stop terrorist acts.  Although Noordin Top’s death, 
through leadership targeting, eventually lead to his network’s demise, it did not solve the 
bigger problem of terrorist activities in Indonesia.  The remnants of this network simply 
                                                 
60 Ioannis Michaletos,“The International Islamic Jihad: The first global terrorist movement in history,” 
International Analyst Network (2010), http://www.analystnetwork.com/article.php?art_id=3446 (accessed 
February 04, 2011). 
61 Yochi J. Dreazen, “IED Casualties Up Despite Increased Vigilance,” National Journal (2011), 
http://www.nationaljournal.com/nationalsecurity/ied-casualties-up-despite-increased-vigilance-20110303 
(accessed February 07, 2011). 
62 Nancy Roberts and Sean Everton,” Strategies for Combating Dark Networks,” Journal of Social 
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evolved and took on a new face.  Most of Noordin’s key operators simply moved on and 
began operating with other terrorist cells.  To stop the evolution of terrorist cells from 
reincarnating into new cells, Indonesia has worked to contain terrorism through 
rehabilitation and de-radicalization programs.  
This chapter describes how Noordin created his network.  It also shows the 
amount of information Indonesia was able to gather on Noordin’s network and, yet, was 
still unable to defeat it through targeting the leadership alone.  Next, it describes how 
Indonesia’s Counter Terrorism (CT) success did not come from leadership targeting, but 
by working towards undermining the heart of the problem, the ideology that fed 
recruitment. 
B. NOORDIN’S NETWORK 
Noordin Mohammad Top, an explosive expert, was initially a member of Jemaah 
Islamiyah (JI).  However, feeling that JI needed to do more, he left in 2006 to form his 
own splinter group, which he called Tanzim Qaedat al-Jihad, also known as Al-Qaeda in 
the Malay Archipelago.63  While operating directly under JI, his network was responsible 
for the 2003 JW Marriot hotel bombing in Jakarta, the 2004 Australian embassy bombing 
in Jakarta, and the 2005 Bali bombing, the island’s second major terrorist attack, which 
earned him a spot on the FBI’s third major “most wanted list,” in 2006.64  These attacks 
made Noordin one of the most feared bomb makers in South East Asia and led to a 
conflict between Noordin and JI members because of high civilian casualties.  Following 
the Bali bombing, an Indonesian task force began to crackdown on top JI members, and 
Noordin was forced to operate under his new cell, Tanzim Qaedat al-Jihad.  Despite 
being well known by an Indonesian task force, which had infiltrated his network, 
Noordin was able to carry out the 2009 JW Marriot and Ritz-Carlton hotel bombings in 
Jakarta before being killed by Malaysian forces in 2009.  
                                                 
63 Jolene Jerard. “International Conference on Terrorist Rehabilitation (ICTR).” (Report on a 
conference organized by The International Centre of Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) 
Nanyang Technological University. Singapore, 2009). 
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64 Jolene Jerard. “International Conference on Terrorist Rehabilitation (ICTR),” 35. 
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The success of Noordin’s network can be attributed to the way in which he 
formed his network.  He built a social network based on trust, which “networks consist of 
ramified interpersonal connections, consisting mainly of strong ties, within which people 
set valued, consequential, long-term resources and enterprises at risk to the malfeasance, 
mistakes, or failures of others.”65  Noordin relied heavily on people he knew through 
friendship, kinship, religious affiliation, and school affiliations.66  In the bombings 
mentioned above, Noordin was able to recruit, gain financial backing, and evade police, 
all through the help of his social network.  The ways in which Noordin used his network 
to execute the bombings in Jakarta in 2003 and 2004 are described below. 
C. 2003 MARRIOTT BOMBING  
Noordin’s operational network for the 2003 Marriott Bombing consisted of nine 
members (see Table 2).67  All of the members had strong ties linked together by personal 
relationships and through organizations that shared the same values, which gave each 
member a vested interest to see the operation succeed.  In order for the bombing to be 
successful, each member had to depend on others to perform their roles.  Azhari Husin, 
with the help of Noordin, planned the bombings.  Asmar Latin Sani, who was the 
operation’s suicide bomber, helped provide financial support along with Toni Togar, who 
robbed a bank in Medan to fund the operation.  Ismail transported cash from Dunnai to 
Lampung, while Idris’ job was to transport the explosives used in the operation which 
were stored at Siliwangi’s house.  Four of the members Noordin knew from school, and 
the others he knew through JI membership.  Noordin often communicated through email 
by code to deliver instructions, but it was his personal relationships that generated trust 
amongst members and made this network strong. 
 
                                                 
65 Charles Tilly, Trust and Rule, (Cambridge University Press, 2005):12. 
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Name Affiliation Role 
Noordin Moh. Top  School of Luqmanul 
Hakiem, JI member 
Core of Network 
Azhari Husin School of Luqmanul 
Hakiem, JI member 
Master Bomb Technician, 
Field Commander  
Indrawarman alias Toni 
Togar 
School of Ngruki, JI 
member 
Raised funds for Bombing 
Mohammed Rais School of Luqmanul 
Hakiem, JI member, 
Noordins Brothern-law          
Assisted Noordin with 
planning 




Ismail alias Mohamed 
Ikhwan 
School of Luqmanul 
Hakiem, JI member 
Courier for Noordin 
Sardona Siliwangi School of Ngruki, JI 
member 
House used to store 
explosives, Facilitated 
Financial transaction  
Masrizal bin Ali alias Tohir School of Luqmanul 
Hakiem, JI member 
Surveyed targets, rented 
vehicles, and transported 
explosives 
Mohamed Ihsan alias  Idris School of Ngruki, JI 
member 
Explosive transporter  
Table 2.   Noordin’s Marriot Bombers68 
D. 2004 AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY BOMBING 
After the 2003 Marriott hotel bombing, Noordin and Azhari attracted considerable 
police attention and were forced underground.  While in hiding, Noordin depended 
heavily on his strong ties to help him evade the police.  During this time, he pieced 
together a network similar to the one used in the 2003 Marriott Bombing that he would 
use in 2004 to bomb the Australian Embassy.  He recruited his operational network from 
three sources: JI’s East Java division, JI schools, and an old Darul Islam (DI) 
organization.  This network, like the 2003 Marriott hotel bombing one, was based on trust 
and personal relations, but what made this network different was that he drew on the 
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personal networks of others.69  Similar to the 2003 Marriott Hotel bombing, the network 
was strong because members trusted each other and shared the same ideology and goals 
as Noordin (see Table 3). 
 
Name Affiliation Role 
Son Hadi School of Ngruki, Darul 
Islam member, Associate of 
Fahim 
Harbored Noordin & Azhari 
along with their lethal bomb 
making materials 
Syaifuddin Umar alias Abu 
Fida 
JI member East Java Helped Noordin acquire 
bomb- material 
Gempur Angkoro alias Jabir School of Ngruki, JI 
member Central Java 
Suicide bomb recruiter, 
Bomb maker  
Bagus Budi Pranoto alias 
Urwah 
JI member Linked Noordin to Iwan 
Dharmawan  
Lutfi Haidaroh alias Ubeid School of Ngruki, JI 
member East Java 
Courier for Noordin 
Al-Anshori School of Ngruki, JI 
member 
Bomb-maker 
Usman bin Sef Head of JI wakalah East 
Java 
Protected Noordin, 
Introduced Noordin to JI 
members 
Iwan Dharmawan alias Rois Ring Banten member Field commander, 
connection to Darul Islam 
members 
Table 3.   Noordin’s Australian Embassy Bombers70 
From JI’s East Java division, Noordin made contact with a fellow JI member, 
Fahim, who was head of JI’s wakalah for East Java.  Fahim provided both explosives and 
hiding.  Fahim also made contact with one of his confidants, Son Hadi, in order to place 
Noordin and Azhari in hiding.  After bouncing around from JI member to JI member, Son 
Hadi eventually placed Noordin with a business associate, Farouk, who was not a JI 
                                                 
69 International Crisis Group. (2006). Terrorism in Indonesia: Noordin’s Networks (No. Asia 
Report#114), (Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group): 5. 
70 International Crisis Group. (2006). Terrorism in Indonesia: Noordin’s Networks (No. Asia 
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member.71  Noordin, who trusted Son Hadi because of his relationship with Fahim, now 
trusted Farouk because of Son Hadi’s faith in him.  Farouk then became a key person to 
the operations as he housed Noordin, along with his explosives.  
Another non-JI member Noordin placed his trust in was a committed mujahidin 
by the name of Rois, who was tasked with setting up a training camp to select suicide 
bombers.  From this camp Heri Golun was handpicked, and on September 9, 2004, he 
blew himself up in front of the Australian Embassy.  Displaying how much trust Noordin 
had in his network, he made sure he met with every individual involved in the bombing, 
giving him a direct link to everyone.   
E. INDONESIA’S CT OPERATIONS 
Over the past decade, Indonesia has been devastated by numerous terrorist 
attacks.  To date, Indonesia’s approach to disrupting terrorist networks is believed by 
many to be the best counterterrorism strategy for combating terrorism.  Instead of 
declaring war on terrorists, it treats terrorists as criminals by convicting them in courts.  
Indonesia takes this approach out of fear that military confrontation would only nurture 
further radicalization.72  In 2003, the Indonesian government created Detachment 88, an 
antiterrorist police force, to uncover terrorist networks, hunt down and capture top 
militants.73  This approach helped to decrease the terrorist threat, but Indonesia has 
learned that taking out key members and leaders is not enough to stop the network.  
A popular CT theory suggests leadership targeting is an effective way to attack 
the network.  While this approach has proven successful in some instances, it has not 
been the case for Indonesian officials.  For example, from 2003–2009, Detachment 88 
heavily pursued Noordin’s splinter cell.  Several members of Noordin’s network were 
apprehended, but these arrests failed to eliminate the threat.  For instance, in 2003 
Mohammed Rais, who was Noordin’s brother-in-law and helped in the early stages of the 
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Marriott bombing, was arrested in April prior to an August Marriot bombing.  This did 
not deter Noordin, however; he simply replaced and carried out the attack.74  Similarly, 
the arrest of JI leader Fahim, who provided Noordin with explosives and contacts to key 
contacts three months prior to the 2004 Embassy bombing, did little to stop the massacre 
from happening.75  And in 2006 Detachment 88 successfully tracked and killed one of 
Noordin’s partners, the master bomb maker, Dr. Azahari (he was responsible for making 
the bombs in the 2002–2005 attacks), but this did not stop future attacks, such as the 2009 
JW Marriott and Ritz-Carlton bombings, from occurring.  
Noordin’s network was composed of members with the same salafi jihadist 
ideology, whom he trusted and pieced together from several organizations.76  As 
Detachment 88 removed members of Noordin’s network, a new member of Noordin’s 
network stepped in to take his place.  In other words, the terrorist organization was bigger 
than just one man; it was comprised of networks connected by an ideology.  It was like 
other Jihadi groups, which do not disappear after waves of arrests; they evolve and 
mutate, taking on new form.”77  Noordin, himself, was just the face or “big ticket name” 
JI used to promote its cause.  
After Noordin was killed in 2009, his splinter cell was soon replaced by another JI 
splinter cell headed by Dulmatin.  Dulmatin became the new face of JI, and was used to 
recruit and terrorize.  As predicted by research from Jordan and Crenshaw, removing top 
leaders did not put a stop to the terrorist network.78  Terrorists, such as Urwah, Ubaid, 
and Toni Togar, who were formerly part of Noordin’s network, joined Dumatin’s 
network after Noordin’s death, perpetuating the cycle.  
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Anti-terrorism chief General Ansyaad Mbai, Indonesian official who coordinates 
their counter-terrorism policy, seems aware of this cycle and admits that killing the leader 
alone will not work.  
Today’s terrorist leaders are the children, grandchildren, relatives or close 
associates of those executed in the past.  As long as we do not neutralize 
their radical ideology, we will be unable to stop their movement.79  
In efforts to "win the hearts and minds" of the radicals, the Indonesian 
government he adopted de-radicalization programs to counter the spread of these 
ideologies.80  One government program provides prisoners who cooperate with better 
medical care and pay for their children’s education.  Another allows convicted terrorists 
to participate in community outreach programs.  Detachment 88 also provides spiritual 
counselors who attempt to persuade militants that the teachings they hold are incorrect.81  
The Indonesian government’s de-radicalization effort “has resulted in the development of 
an argument within the terrorist network that bombing served no purpose, failed to rally 
people to support their cause and was indeed counterproductive.”82  Sidney Jones, an 
anti-terrorism analyst, says “improvements in the social and political conditions in the 
country have made it harder for terrorist recruitment.”83  Jones acknowledges that 
Indonesia’s threat of terrorism remains, but their policy to fight terrorism has begun to 
contain the problem.84 
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Indonesia’s CT strategy is an operation the world can learn from.  Their success is 
credited to their understanding of the terrorist network, which enabled them to carry out 
simultaneous applications of both a hard and soft approach.  In particular, applying the 
soft approach, through the use of government programs, helped officials gain the 
cooperation of some former terrorists, such as Nasir Abbas and Ali Imron, which helped 
them gain an understanding of the kinship, friendship, and religious motives that foster 
terrorist networks in Indonesia.  As in the case of Noordin’s network, these factors have 
become the basis for the Indonesian police to build a systematic approach in dealing with 
terrorists.85  
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V. OPERATION YARBOROUGH 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In 2003, the U.S. government spearheaded an invasion against Iraq with the aim 
of deposing Saddam Hussein and capturing the country’s alleged Weapons of Mass 
Destruction.  The U.S. military and Coalition forces succeeded in toppling Saddam’s 
regime in a matter of days, but the smooth transition to a more representative, if not 
likeable, government did not occur.  Instead, Iraq became a country teetering on the edge 
of collapse, vacillating between an insurgency and a civil war.   
The following chapter will briefly cover the rise to power of Muqtada al-Sadr, the 
charismatic Shia cleric responsible for some of the attacks on coalition forces via his 
Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) militia.  The 2003 break in the Sadrist movement, caused by a 
disagreement between Muqtada al-Sadr and his right hand man Qais Khazali, led to the 
creation of Shia Special Groups, which also fought coalition forces.86  This chapter 
focuses on Operation Yarborough, executed in 2005, and the disruption of Shia insurgent 
operations in the south by a small “networked” group of U.S. Soldiers, which provides a 
unique perspective on how to successfully execute attack the network operations. 
B. BACKGROUND 
The al-Sadr family lineage has produced great Shia leaders who have lived and 
died in support of social, political and religious rights for Shia in Iraq.  Grand Ayatollah 
Mohammed Baqir al-Sadr, cousin to Ayatollah Mohammed Sadeq al-Sadr and Muqtada 
al-Sadr’s father-in-law, was a renowned Shia scholar who instilled Shia Nationalism in 
his followers.87  He was the founder of the Dawa party, a political movement that 
currently controls the majority block of the government in Iraq, and he effectively 
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mobilized Shia youth though his rhetoric and writing.  His ability to mobilize the Shia 
brought unwanted attention from the Baathist Regime, eventually leading to his brutal 
murder in 1980.88   
Ayatollah Mohammed Sadeq al-Sadr, Muqtada’s father, was one of several 
leaders sought out by Saddam Hussein’s regime in an attempt to settle Shia hostilities 
following the failed Shia uprising after the 1991 Persian Gulf War.89  Sadeq established 
schools and mosques, particularly in the impoverished Baghdad neighborhood of Sadr 
city, issued a fatwa that reinvigorated Friday prayers for the Shia, which had been banned 
by the ruling Baathist regime, and effectively networked and gained mass appeal.90  
Through all of this, Sadeq emerged as a great leader of the oppressed Shia that possessed 
an innate ability to motivate his followers through his powerful rhetoric.  The breaking 
point between Sadeq and Saddam’s regime came in 1999, when Sadeq al-Sadr demanded 
the release of scholars and clergy still imprisoned for the 1991 uprising, a call that 
mobilized tens-of-thousands in protest.  For this, he and two of his sons were gunned 
down less than a week later.91 
Muqtada al-Sadr, Sadeq al-Sadr’s only surviving son, was unable to direct the 
Sadrist movement following the death of his father because he was under house arrest.  It 
is doubtful that even if he were a free man at the time of his father’s death he would have 
garnered the necessary support because of his youth, lack of clerical status, and personal 
demeanor.92   
Thus, in the wake of Sadeq al-Sadr’s death, Sadeq al-Sadr’s students ran the 
Sadrist movement.  With the outbreak of the Iraq War in 2003, however, Muqtada 
emerged as one of several leaders of the Shia.  Part of Muqtada’s appeal was his name; he 
was a Sadr after all and referenced by the title “Sayyid,” which denotes a direct 
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descendant of the Prophet Mohammed.  He also profited from the support of the Sadrist 
movement, which his father founded, via its networks and organization.  Perhaps most 
important, the Ayatollah Kazem al-Haeri, a prestigious Iranian cleric in Qom Iran, 
appointed Muqtada his deputy and representative in Iraq. 93  With al-Haeri’s direction, 
Muqtada al-Sadr immediately went on the offensive rhetorically and through the 
activation of the Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM), a militia created to safeguard the Iraqi Shia.  
With a militia in place and a means to provide social services to the poorer segments of 
the Shia in Baghdad, Muqtada sought to form the Sadrist movement into a Hezbollah like 
organization that would control various ministerial offices and seats in Parliament.94  
Muqtada al-Sadr’s more immediate focus, however, seemed to be the removal of U.S. 
and Coalition Forces from Iraq, which his Shia followers viewed as unwanted occupiers.   
In 2004 JAM, under the direction of Muqtada, launched an offensive against 
Coalition Forces, which lasted for two months and resulted in serious losses for Sadr led 
JAM in terms of both men and credibility.  Then in the beginning of 2005, a split 
emerged between Muqtada al-Sadr, who wanted to join in the Iraqi government, and 
those that insisted on maintaining a more militant stance, including Qais Khazali, a 
student of Sadeq al-Sadr and Muqtada’s official spokesperson.95  Qais Khazali eventually 
formed the Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH or League of the Righteous), which was trained by 
the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps—Qods Force (IRGC-QF).96  The League of the 
Righteous along with other splinter Special Groups (SG) became masters of IEDs, small 
arm attacks, and the emplacement of explosively formed penetrators (EFPs).97  
In early 2007, Muqtada al-Sadr declared a cease fire, deactivated JAM, and 
moved to Iran; however, his departure did nothing to stem the flow attacks by radicalized 
JAM members that wanted to continue in armed resistance and SGs actively targeting 
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Coalition Forces across southern Iraq.98  In April 2007, the British Military forces 
returned responsibility of Maysan Province, a Shia stronghold, to Iraqi forces. 99  
Following the transition of authority, JAM-SG personnel operated without fear of 
consequence in the southern Province of Maysan and completely controlled the city of al 
Amarah.100  Each of the organizations, radicalized remnants of JAM as well as various 
SG, represented separate entities but retained underlying linkages that produced a 
formidable network.   
C. IT TAKES A NETWORK101 
In order to combat the rising threat posed by Shia SGs, the U.S. military placed 
multiple Special Forces (SF) Operation Detachments Alpha (ODA) in the south.  An 
ODA is a twelve man element designed to plan and conduct unilateral operations and 
function in remote and hostile environment for extended time with minimum external 
direction.  SF ODAs also develop, organize, equip, train, and advise up to a battalion 
sized irregular indigenous force as well as train, advise, and assist multi-national forces 
and agencies.102  In order to perform these tasks, an ODA must leverage reach-back 
capabilities provided by a larger military element, typically a SF Battalion located on an 
operational base, against the needs of the indigenous forces it is advising.  An ODA, 
therefore, tends to function as part of a larger hierarchal organization when in garrison, 
and operate as a distributed and highly adaptable semi-autonomous unit when deployed 
in an advisory capacity.  They act as the local bridge, or linking mechanism, between the 
larger forces and local forces during Major Combat Operations.103 
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In late 2007 and into early 2008, the U.S. military rotated approximately nine 
ODAs through southern Iraq to train and advise the Iraqi military.104  Networked to a 
larger Army SF Battalion contingency, the twelve-man ODAs were also dispersed to 
facilitate Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in quelling the violence and stabilizing the region.  
One of those teams was ODA 5331.  ODA 5331 partnered with the city of an-Nasiriyah 
and the regionally based Iraqi Special Weapons and Tactics (ISWAT) Team for support 
in security operations105 
On January 18, 2008, a fight broke out in an-Nasiriyah between the Iraqi police 
and a SG.  In the first fifteen minutes of fighting, the SG had killed four of five Iraqi 
police commanders and severely wounded the fifth with headshots from snipers; the 
ISWAT commander was one of these casualties.106  Upon request from the ISWAT 
deputy commander, ODA 5331 supplied necessary assistance in triage efforts, 
coordinating and consolidating the reorganization of the remaining troops, and 
reestablishing the command and control element.  More importantly, ODA 5331 ensured 
accurate close air support to prevent collateral damage to the densely populated city.107  
This conscious effort to limit collateral damage paid off in two important ways; first, it 
reduced the threat of backlash from the population and, second, the limited air strikes 
proved the Iraqi troops could fight an extended engagement with minimal support and 
win. 
The following day, ODA 5331, the remaining Iraqi Security leaders, and Major 
General Habib, the 10th Iraqi Army division commander, met to discuss the battle.  The 
meeting produced a combined Army and police offensive aimed at quieting the violence 
in the city.  The joint effort succeeded in establishing security by the afternoon and an 
important friendship began between Maj Gen Habib and ODA 5331.108 
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By February 2008, Maj Gen Habib and ODA 5331 were involved in planning 
Operation Yarborough, which aimed to drive JAM and related SG out of al Amarah.  The 
plan was to conduct a disruption campaign that would incorporate tactical checkpoints, 
raids, deception operations, psychological operation leaflet drops and a whisper 
messaging campaign in order to apply constant pressure to JAM-SG personnel.109   
Operation Yarborough started with hellfire missile eliminated insurgents who 
were setting an IED in the vicinity of a future tactical checkpoint.  This attack was 
followed by a direct action raid, utilizing combined U.S. and Iraqi forces, designed 
primarily to achieve psychological effects.  Joint efforts delivered two messages; the first, 
non-verbal, was that Iraqi forces would no longer allow JAM-SG to operate with 
impunity and the second, verbal, was that JAM-SG no longer had a safe haven in al-
Amarah.  This message campaign was followed by a tactical checkpoint that further 
emphasized the omnipotence of the government of Iraqi (GoI).  Within days of these 
actions the affects were seen as the local population was already supporting GoI by 
stating at checkpoints they wanted the JAM criminals removed, and intelligence verified 
JAM’s confusion and nervousness generated by the raid.110   
The Joint U.S.-Iraqi team maintained constant pressure on JAM-SG between the 
checkpoints, leaflet drops, zero collateral damage bombings, and ongoing deception.  In 
addition U.S. and Iraqi forces conducted targeted raids that spread the word that the 
insurgents would no longer be tolerated.  The combinations of earlier JAM-SG clearance 
operations by networked ODA teams in cities like Basra funneled fleeing fighters into al-
Amarah where Operation Yarborough continued the relentless pressure.111  This pressure 
compelled the leadership to flee into Iran, leaving lower level members to plan 
operations, which they did ineffectively.  The counter network operations proved so 
decisive that Brigadier General Qassem Suleimani, Commander IRGC-QF, helped assist 
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in the negotiated ceasefire between GoI and the beleaguered militias.112  This 
involvement of high-ranking Iranian in Iraqi peace negotiations further revealed the level 
of control the government of Iran had over the security situation in the province.  
In the end, the twelve-man networked ODA’s positive results were highly 
effective in defeating the combined opposing network.  In developing targeting packages 
and focusing tactical operations they garnered an operational victory. 
D. CONCLUSION 
As mentioned in Chapter II, the application of SNA and its associated terms is 
more of an art than an exact science.  In the real world, human interaction is not easily 
placed into specific categories.  It is for this reason that both the ODA and the elements 
of JAM and the SG’s can be flatter and more distributed units in an operational setting 
and still be networked into the larger hierarchal organization.  Whether an organization is 
distributed or hierarchical, it is the ability to bridge the units together that effectively 
networks these organizations together.  This concept is also visible in Indonesia’s 
Detachment 88 battle against Noordin’s network, described in Chapter IV, and Chapter 
III’s description of the French SAS battle against the Algerian FLN. 
In successfully attacking and disrupting the JAM-SG, ODA 5331 showed how 
understanding the context of a network not only provides multiple avenues for attack, but 
allows for effective tactics that can be employed according to the known situation.  With 
reach back capability to confirm the context of targeted individuals, ODA 5331 
maximized the output of their twelve-man element.  The constant and directed pressure 
applied in Operation Yarborough debilitated the JAM-SG network and forced leaders 
into hiding in Iran.113  Additionally, attention to detail, such as the close control of air 
support, gained the trust and favor of the local population.  Operation Yarborough also 
helped to build the capacity and competency of Iraqi forces in defeating these insurgents.   
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VI. A WAR OF CONTEXT  
Command and Control Warfare (C2W), the unity of command that ties together 
all the operational functions and tasks, is considered one of the U.S. Military’s greatest 
strengths.114  In reaction to the post-September 11 security environment and the wars the 
United States is now fighting, there has been a shift in the organizational design of the 
U.S. military, including the structure of troops and requirements for specific skill sets.  
Gone are the “good old days” when war was against a clearly defined, dogmatically 
hierarchal military of another state.  Present day adversaries are now mostly distributed 
and highly adaptable sub-state organizations.  Terrorist network expert John Arquilla 
addresses this issue in his “Conflict in the Information Age” seminar, held at the Naval 
Postgraduate School.  He advances the idea that, since there has been a shift in 
organizational design of our forces, then why should we not shift the term C2W to 
command and “something else?”115  He then invites his class to fill in the blank.  This 
sort of exercise could be just the right idea set to help the U.S. military to maintain its 
classical dominance in command and control.  Instead of being bogged down by a term 
that was designed for a conventional fight, a new term could emerge that accurately 
depicts the types of conflicts in which the U.S. military is currently involved.   
The intention of this thesis has been to fill in the blank of Arquilla’s exercise with 
the word “context”—this is a fight to understand context.  In other words, in order to 
defeat our adversaries, it is necessary to have an understanding of their background, 
structure, and how they relate to society and their peer group.  Adopting this concept 
would encourage the military to reevaluate and redefine tactics, techniques, and 
procedures and this, in turn, would have a positive effect in reshaping doctrine to 
resemble the fight we are in as opposed to the fight we want.  The change would also 
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provide the opportunity to stop “putting the square peg in the round hole,” by introducing 
new concepts that would help inform new decision matrices.   
The manufacture and proper placement of IEDs requires advanced skill and 
access to proper materials.  This is what makes fighting the “War of Context” so vital in 
IED attack the network operations.  Understanding the networks that provide training, 
financial backing, as well as motivation is not only essential to the infiltration of a 
network but is the key to uncovering the root of the problem and the associated linkages. 
A. WHICH WAY TO THE FUTURE? 
It is important for the military to continue to move forward and not stagnate.  As 
humans, we are creatures of habit, and a habit deeply ingrained in military culture 
includes assumptions about how an organization must operate to survive “first contact.”  
In the current environment, the U.S. military is not facing masses of troops aligned under 
a hierarchal organization.  Today’s reality is that the major adversary is a distributed 
organization that despises the west and the ideas of modernity, yet uses the internet and 
other tools of modernity on par with any “modern” society to attack and advance its 
goals.  The enemy understands how to get their message out and, at least for now, can 
effectively execute their planned operations by providing guidance rather than orders.   
A focused SNA approach would provide the framework to build and sustain 
knowledge of dark networks across time and unit rotations.  At the operational level, 
SNA could provide the context that would then allow a commander to maximize the use 
of his resources.  This economical use of force, as highlighted in the case studies, focuses 
limited yet technologically based assets to targeting nodes determined to be critical links 
of an organization.  However, targeting critical nodes is not the only way to dismantle a 
dark network.  SNA provides a strong framework for creating context, but is only one 
tool in a larger tool box at the commander’s disposal. 
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SNA is not a new idea to counterinsurgency manuals, FM 3-24 appendix B, for 
example, addresses SNA.116  FM 3-24’s overview, however, does not provide a focused 
analysis for the time constrained operational commander.  Chapters I and II of this thesis 
focused on providing an analytical tool for commanders who seek to understand the 
organizational structure of irregular armed forces.  Chapter I did this through defining 
weak links.  Weak links, or acquaintances, are the conduits that support the rapid 
diffusion of information and logistics across social clusters.  Weak links, in other words, 
are the path of least resistance for the free flow of money and information.  Attacking 
these links, therefore, has a great effect on disrupting the larger network’s activities.   
Chapter II, provided definitions for overall network types followed by an analysis 
of a few fundamental SNA concepts, specifically measures of centrality.  These macro 
and micro measures were then placed into a matrix in order to provide a visual tool to 
assist in analysis of possible lines of operation, target selection, and combinations of the 
two.  By advancing a limited set of ideas these chapters provide a focused look at SNA, 
so that the operational commander and his staff can rapidly assess individual group 
dynamics without thorough training in sociology or psychology. 
Ultimately, in order for U.S. forces to “attack the network” and reduce their 
ability to use IEDs, they need to first understand the dark network and the context in 
which it functions.117  IEDs provide a dark network an inexpensive, easy to manufacture, 
and force multiplying tactic against a superior force.  The strategic influence of IEDs is a 
direct result of its lethality and the visceral reaction its victims and viewers experience.118  
In order for U.S. strategy to be successful it needs to go beyond the weapon and address 
the issues that caused the mobilization of the insurgency or a terrorist’s organization.  
This is the War of Context.   
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The objective of the case study section was to look at three random cases where a 
formal government showed some form of success when combating an insurgency or 
terrorist organization, whose strategic approach focused on the use of IEDs.  A common 
trait, in each of the three cases, was that the State actors understood “The War of 
Context.”  The French had a great understanding of the FLN’s ideology and their way of 
thinking in Algeria, which allowed them to a get inside the terrorist organization to 
illuminate and expose key leaders in the network.  Because of their understanding, the 
French knew how to create disruption between ALN members and originate false 
documents that would raise distrust in the organization.  It was in knowing their 
oppositions’ way of thinking and “who’s who” that lead to the dismantling of the ALN.  
The French achieved an operational victory in defeating the FLN’s bomb ALN network 
but, ultimately, other methods used such as torture, for example, caused a strategic 
failure.  Not understanding the “big picture” and how their actions affected the people of 
Algeria, they could not stop the FLN from gaining supporters and lost the overall “big 
war”.  The French operation provides a unique example of how the understanding of war 
being fought affects, both positively and negatively, the strategic aims of a nation. 
As in the Algerian case study, the same principles hold true in the disruptions of 
Noordin’s network.  The Indonesians set out to understand their opponents.  Detachment 
88’s success came from their ability to discover the links and nodes between Noordin and 
his affiliates.  Through careful preparation, Detachment 88 was able to track and 
assassinate Noordin, thus bringing an end to his network.  With proper context, 
operational, commanders are able to develop lines of operation to attack and disrupt 
enemy networks.   
As in any other terrorists’ organization or oppressed society, a new leader or 
uprising can form because there has not been change in the local environment.  Although 
Indonesia knew they could not stop new groups from forming, they saw the “big picture” 
and created a governmental de-radicalizations program changing the mind set of 




to attack the ideologies that made terrorist violent.  By educating terrorist on the fallacies 
within their beliefs and allowing them to express their religious beliefs, Indonesia is able 
to contain violent acts of terrorism.  
In Iraq, ODA 5331 repeated the logic of understanding the enemy and attacking 
via multiple lines of operation.  ODA 5331 proved this concept as they applied aspects of 
deception, psychological manipulation, and node targeting against the information they 
had on the composition of the enemy’s network.  The constant and directed pressure 
applied in Operation Yarborough debilitated the JAM-SG network.  By successfully 
securing al-Amarah ODA 5331 helped to build the capacity and competency of Iraqi 
forces in defeating the Shia insurgents. 
Just as defeating IEDs at the operational and tactical level require going beyond 
the weapon, a Strategy of Context must involve the interagency powers inherent in the 
Department of State and the Department of Defense in order to defeat the wider context 
in which these networks emerged.119  This wider Strategy of Context focuses on the 
structure of the state.  The Strategy of Context can then be expected to revolve around 
two major points; the definition of what constitutes a state and how much time will be 
allotted to resolve this dilemma.  Charles Tilly, Ghani et al. and Robert Rotberg are only 
a few of the scholars that have provided a structure that defines a functional nation-state, 
yet complete agreement amongst these lists does not exist.120  Security of the included 
citizenry seems to rank high with each, yet the differences highlight the lack of consensus 
within academia on what constitutes a state.  The challenge, for the political-military 
professionals, then becomes what criteria are applicable, which aspects matter and how to 
maximize assets to fix or re-build the State.   
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1975), 27. A. Ghani, C. Lockhart, and M. Carnahan, “Closing the Sovereignty Gap: An Approach to State-
Building,” Overseas Development Institute (London: 2005), 6. Robert I. Rotberg, “Strengthening 
Governance: Ranking Countries Would Help.” The Washington Quarterly 28, no. 1 (2004): 71–81. 
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Secondly, and arguably equally if not more important, is the expectation and 
value of time.  This is the time that it takes the U.S. governmental bureaucracy to analyze 
a situation and organize a response to terrorist and insurgent behavior.121  The time 
citizens of the U.S. will allow the military to remain in a country as well as the amount of 
time an indigenous population will accept a large U.S. presence.  Time, also, allows a 
terror organization or insurgency to build its message as well as its base and become a 
self-sustaining force.122 
The conundrum posed by the composition of the state and time to solve this 
problem are clearly not just problems for the military, therefore, it requires more than the 
military to fix.  Short of a combined Strategy of Context, that harnesses the power of the 
interagency, the war will not be won and the U.S. military will need to remain or return to 
the same areas until these underlying issues are resolved. 
 
 
                                                 
121 Martha Crenshaw, “How Terrorism Declines,” 86. 
122 Martha Crenshaw, “How Terrorism Declines,” 79. 
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